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By Christine Eibner, Dana P. Goldman, Jeffrey Sullivan, and Alan M. Garber
Three Large-Scale Changes To
The Medicare Program Could Curb
Its Costs But Also Reduce
Enrollment
ABSTRACT With Medicare spending projected to increase to 24 percent of
all federal spending and to equal 6 percent of the gross domestic product
by 2037, policy makers are again considering ways to curb the program’s
spending growth. We used a microsimulation approach to estimate three
scenarios: imposing a means-tested premium for Part A hospital
insurance, introducing a premium support credit to purchase health
insurance, and increasing the eligibility age to sixty-seven. We found that
the scenarios would lead to reductions in cumulative Medicare spending
in 2012–36 of 2.4–24.0 percent. However, the scenarios also would
increase out-of-pocket spending for enrollees and, in some cases, cause
millions of seniors not to enroll in the program and to be left without
coverage. To achieve substantial cost savings without causing substantial
lack of coverage among seniors, policy makers should consider benefit
changes in combination with other options, such as some of those now
being contemplated by the Obama administration and Congress.
T
he Congressional Budget Office
projects that—absent any changes
in existing law and policies—
Medicare will account for 24 per-
cent of all federal spending and
6 percent of the US gross domestic product by
2037.1 The increase in Medicare spending,
which now accounts for 16 percent of federal
outlays, is amajor factor in the projected growth
of the national debt.1
The Affordable Care Act introduced a number
of policy changes to reduce Medicare costs. The
largest expected savings stem from reductions in
payments toMedicare Advantage plans—private
plans that have historically received more fund-
ing per enrollee than traditional fee-for-service
Medicare—and from reductions in annual pay-
ment increases for certain types of providers,
including hospitals. However, some studies sug-
gest that lower provider fees increase the volume
of services provided, reducing the efficacy of
these policies as a way of containing costs.2
Various analysts have argued that without poli-
cies that fundamentally change Medicare’s cost
structure, Congress may face irresistible pres-
sure to reverse the features of the Affordable
Care Act that are intended to limit Medicare’s
expenditure growth.3
The Independent Payment Advisory Board,
created by the Affordable Care Act to advise
Congress on additional ways to reduce Medi-
care spending, by law cannot consider most
changes that would increase costs to Medicare
beneficiaries. These changes include altering
Part B premiums, which cover physician visits,
lab services, and equipment such aswheelchairs;
adding premiums for Part A,whose beneficiaries
historically have not paid premiums because
they paid payroll taxes into the Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund to support the program
during their years of employment; and increas-
ing deductibles or copayments. The board is also
prohibited from considering policies that would
modify eligibility requirements, such as increas-
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ing the age of eligibility.
Despite these restrictions, from 2015 through
2019 the Independent Payment Advisory Board
is charged with making recommendations to
keep annual Medicare cost growth at a level be-
tween the average inflation rate for all goods
(measured using the Consumer Price Index)
and the average inflation rate for medical ser-
vices. After 2019 the board’s recommendations
must constrain Medicare growth to be less than
the rate of growth in the gross domestic product
plus one percentage point.
Because theboard is limited in thepolicies that
it may consider, many stakeholders fear that its
primary tool to address cost increases will be
further reductions to provider payments. The
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Office of the Actuary has cautioned that the
board’s requirement to reduce costs, given its
constrained set of options, represents an “ex-
ceedingly difficult challenge.”4
Reluctance to consider policies that directly
affect beneficiaries’ demand for care is not a
new phenomenon for Medicare. The Medicare
eligibility age, for example, has remained con-
stant at sixty-five since theprogrambegannearly
fifty years ago, although life expectancy at birth
in the United States increased by eight years
between 1965 and 2010.5 Furthermore, as noted
above, Medicare Part A has never required a
premium.
One policy lever that has been used frequently
over the years to affect government Medicare
spending is the Part B premium. Single people
with annual incomes of less than $85,000 now
pay a monthly premium of 25 percent of Part B
costs ($104.90 in 2013). This amount increases
withbeneficiary incomeona sliding scale, reach-
ing 80 percent of costs for people with incomes
above $214,000. Thresholds for couples are
twice the individual amounts—for example,
$170,000 instead of $85,000.
In this articlewe evaluate the long-termspend-
ing and enrollment effects of three large-scale
changes to the Medicare program that would
go beyond the policies allowed under the
Affordable Care Act. Specifically, we consider
imposing means-tested premiums for Medicare
Part A; converting Parts A, B, and C to a pre-
mium-support plan; and increasing the eligibil-
ity age to sixty-seven.
The policies we consider reflect a range of
strategies that address the fundamental trade-
off of whether to provide a rich benefit for a
few individuals or a limited benefit for many.
At one extreme, increasing the eligibility age
would preserve the current structure of the
Medicare benefit but provide it to fewer people.
At the other extreme, premium-support credits
would provide a defined contribution amount to
all beneficiaries and require them to shoulder
the costs of health care, including inflation,
above that amount. Because thePartApremiums
we considered are means tested, they fall in the
middle of the spectrum, providing a richer ben-
efit for those with lower incomes.
As noted above, the Independent Payment
Advisory Board is prohibited from considering
these policies. However, one or more of them
may be necessary in the long run to con-
tain costs.
Policy Scenarios
Means Testing Part A Funded primarily
through payroll taxes, which are paid by employ-
ers and employees to the Hospital Insurance
Trust Fund, Medicare Part A has never required
apremiumcontribution fromenrollees. Thepos-
sibility of adding a means-tested premium for
Part A was originally suggested in the mid-
1990s by the bipartisan Kerrey-Danforth com-
mission on entitlement reform.6 Although the
Kerrey-Danforth proposals were never adopted,
means testing was recently suggested in the con-
text of averting the so-called fiscal cliff.7
In our main scenario we imposed a Part A
premium that rose with income on a sliding
scale.We assumed that people with incomes be-
low $85,000 would pay premium contributions
of 5 percent of expected Part A spending. We
further assumed that the percentage of Part A
spending paid as premiums would increase as
follows: to 10 percent for incomes of $85,001–
$107,000, 15 percent for $107,001–$160,000,
20 percent for $160,001–$214,000, and 25 per-
cent for incomes higher than $214,000. Income
limits were double for couples, and no contribu-
tion was required from people who were dually
eligible for Medicare and Medicaid because of
their low incomes.
We also considered a means-tested Part A pre-
mium that tracked the Part B schedule, with pre-
miums starting at 25 percent of expected spend-
ing for people with incomes below $85,000 and
rising to 80 percent of expected spending for
people with incomes of more than $214,000.
In addition, we considered an alternative sce-
nario in which the Part A premium equaled
10 percent of expected Part A spending, regard-
less of income.
Hospital Insurance (Part A) tax payments cur-
rently consist of a 1.45 percent tax onwages paid
by both the employer and employee on employee
earnings of less than $200,000 ($250,000 for
couples) and a 2.35 percent tax on earnings
above these threshold amounts. In all three of
our scenarios, we assumed that those payments
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would be required regardless of beneficiaries’
Part A take-up. In effect, the tax payments pro-
vide guaranteed access toHospital Insurance at a
subsidized price, with the amount of the subsidy
varying according to the individual’s income.
There are at least two arguments for requiring
a premium as opposed to increasing payroll
taxes. First, because current payroll taxes are
used to fund current Medicare spending, the
payroll tax transfers resources from younger to
older generations. Imposing a Part A premium
would ensure that those currently receiving the
benefit sharedat leastpart of thegrowingburden
of financing the Medicare program.
In addition, although all workers are required
to contribute payroll taxes, not all workers will
receive the same benefit, because some—
disproportionately, minorities and people with
low incomes—will die earlier than others.
Imposing a modest premium, as opposed to in-
creasing payroll taxes, would avoid further wid-
ening socioeconomic disparities in the amount
of taxes paid relative to benefits received.
Premium-Support Credits In our second
scenario we assumed that Medicare enrollees
received a premium-support credit that compen-
sated them for current Parts A and B spending,
less the Part B premium. For example, in 2014 a
person whose income was less than $85,000
would receive a credit of $8,900, which would
cover approximately 85 percent of the estimated
per capita expenditure for hospital and medical
services. The credit could be used only to pur-
chase health insurance.
Although we did not model the details of new
enrollment options, we assumed that the credit
could be used to purchase private health insur-
ance or to buy in to a Medicare-like plan. The
credit would be indexed to the growth of the
gross domestic product.
Raising The Eligibility Age In our third
scenario we considered increasing the Medi-
care eligibility age to sixty-seven from the cur-
rent sixty-five. Such a change would mirror
current Social Security eligibility, and it has
been proposed on numerous occasions.8
We assumed that all of the hypothetical op-
tions would take effect in 2014. Furthermore,
we assumed that the policies would be rolled
out all at once, rather than being phased in over
time.
Study Data And Methods
We projected spending using the Future Elderly
Model,9 a simulation model described in the on-
line Appendix,10 which tracks cohorts older than
age fifty to project the health status and eco-
nomic outcomes of their members. The model
uses data from the Health and Retirement
Study,11 the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey,12 and the Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey.13 Medicare enrollment in the model re-
flects currently observed patterns. Because Part
A has no premium, virtually all Americans older
than sixty-five are enrolled in it. Enrollment is
slightly lower for Part B. People who are not
enrolled in Part B tend to have low incomes
but not to be eligible for Medicaid.
Medicare enrollment and total health spend-
ing were projected using regressions that ac-
counted for age, health conditions, disability,
and other characteristics.We report all spending
estimates in net present value, using a discount
rate of 3 percent.
In our baseline scenario we constrained the
rate of Medicare cost growth to reflect targets
set out in the Affordable Care Act, which are to
be achieved through the policy levers described
above—notably, reductions in provider payment
rates and the recommendations of the Inde-
pendent Payment Advisory Board. Medicare
spending policies related to the Affordable
Care Act play a role complementary to the strat-
egies we considered, since these policies focus
largely on providers instead of consumers’ de-
mand for services.
The Part A premiums that we modeled had
two effects on enrollment. First, the initial im-
position of the premium caused a one-time drop
in enrollment, which we set at 3 percent. We
based this percentage on prior work showing
an increase in the probability of dropping
coverage when premiums are imposed14 and a
sensitivity analysis conducted within the
Future Elderly Model.15
Second, as premiums rose with medical infla-
tion, there was a gradual decrease in enrollment.
We set this elasticity at −0:1 based on the liter-
ature16 and because this number accurately pre-
dicted Medicare Part B take-up under policies
in place before the implementation of the
Affordable Care Act.
We assumed that premium-support credits
could be used only for health insurance and that
enrollees would pay any difference between the
credit amount and the price of health insurance
and attendant costs.We assumed that health in-
surance costs would track the target growth rate
that must be achieved by the Independent
Payment Advisory Board, even after the pre-
mium-support program is imposed. Because this
growth rate is pegged at gross domestic product
plus one percentage point after 2019, while the
premium-support credit would increase only at
the rate of growth of the gross domestic product,
the value of the credit would decline over time.
We treated the difference between predicted
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Medicare cost growth and the credit amount
as a health insurance premium. In sensitivity
analyses we considered an alternative policy in
which credits were indexed to the Consumer
Price Index.
Study Results
Exhibit 1 shows the predicted savings for the
three policies considered, relative to using only
the savings policies in the Affordable Care Act to
constrain costs. With only those policies, total
Medicare spending between 2012 and 2036 is
projected to be $16.7 trillion on a net present
value basis.
Imposing a Part A premium in addition to the
act’s policies resulted in lower government
spending on Medicare, but by the smallest
amount of the three options considered, achiev-
ing a 2.4 percent reduction in spending growth
through 2036. In contrast, increasing the
Medicare eligibility age to sixty-seven reduced
cumulative spending by 7.2 percent over the
same period.
The premium-support plan provided relatively
small savings through 2019, the time period dur-
ing which the Independent Payment Advisory
Board is required to maintain strict limits on
spending growth. However, after 2019 savings
began to increase, and by 2029 the premium-
support plan achieved savings that outpaced
those achieved by increasing the Medicare eli-
gibility age.
Exhibit 2 shows theeffect onPartAenrollment
of each of the three policies considered, relative
to the Affordable Care Act baseline. Because our
analysis was intended to show who is at risk
for being uninsured, we considered enrollment
among people ages sixty-five and older even
when we were evaluating a change in the
Medicare eligibility age.
ImposingaPartApremiumonall beneficiaries
using the main premium scenario described
above reduced projected enrollment in 2020
from57.7 to 56.6million—a decline of just under
2 percent. Premium-support credits also led to a
modest decline in Part A enrollment, with pro-
jected enrollment falling to 55.4million in 2020.
The projected disenrollment under the pre-
mium-support program stemmed from the fact
that enrollee contributions would be required to
cover the difference between the credit amount
and the actual enrollment premium. Increasing
the Medicare eligibility age to sixty-seven led to
a larger decrease in enrollment, leaving almost
eight million sixty-five- and sixty-six-year olds
without hospital insurance coverage in 2020.
Part B enrollment is, by definition, unaffected
by Part A premiums. However, increasing the
Medicare eligibility age reduced Part B en-
rollment from a projected fifty-two million peo-
ple in 2020 to forty-five million (Exhibit 3). The
premium-support program had little effect on
Part B enrollment before 2020, mostly because
of the Independent Payment Advisory Board’s
strict spending targets. However, by 2036 the
program reduced Part B enrollment from
seventy-twomillion people to sixty-eightmillion
because, as health care costs continue to rise, the
value of the credit is reduced, and enrolleesmust
pay an increasing amount out of pocket to obtain
comparable coverage.We did not model the pos-
sibility that peope could use premium-support
credits to obtain partial coverage.
Comparison To Congressional Budget
Office Estimates The Congressional Budget
Office has estimated that increasing the Medi-
care eligibility age to sixty-seven would lead to
$148 billion in savings between 2012 and 2021.
In contrast, we estimated that there would be
$405 billion in savings—a figure we derived by
taking the cumulative difference in costs be-
tween the “Affordable Care Act only” and the
“Eligibility 67” scenarios in Exhibit 1 for the
period 2012–21.17 The difference is explainedpri-
marily by the fact that we assumed the policy
would take full effect in 2014, while the
Congressional Budget Office assumed that it
would begin to take effect in 2014 but not be
fully phased in until 2027. The office’s projected
cumulative savings for 2012–35 was 5 percent,
whereas we estimated a 7.2 percent cumulative
reduction for 2012–36.
Exhibit 1
Projected Medicare Spending, Billions Of Constant Dollars, 2012–36
SOURCE Authors’ estimates using the Future Elderly Model (see Note 8 in text). NOTES “ACA only” is
projected spending with the policy changes included in the Affordable Care Act. “Part A premiums” is
“ACA only” and imposing means-tested premiums for Medicare Part A. “Premium support” is “ACA
only” and converting the entire Medicare program to a premium support plan. “Eligibility 67” is
“ACA only” and raising eligibility for Medicare from age sixty-five to age sixty-seven.
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Although the Congressional Budget Office has
analyzed the effects of a Medicare premium-
support plan, these estimates are not directly
comparable to ours. The office’s estimate in-
cluded larger policy changes, such as the pro-
posalbyRep.PaulRyan(R-WI) to cut$6.2 trillion
in total federal spending during 2012–21, with
additional reductions over time.18 Moreover,
the premium-support program proposed by
Congressman Ryan and analyzed by the
Congressional Budget Office would take effect
only after 2021, whereas we assumed that it
would be implemented in 2014.
The Congressional Budget Office has not con-
sidered the effects of imposing Part A premiums.
Sensitivity Analyses Exhibit 4 summarizes
the results of our sensitivity analyses. If the sav-
ings provisions in the Affordable Care Act failed
to constrain costs, cumulative Medicare spend-
ing in 2012–36 would increase by 14 percent.
This difference points to the importance of the
assumptions in our estimates thatMedicare pay-
ment level adjustments will be maintained and
that the Independent Payment Advisory Board
will achieve its target spending reductions.
If a means-tested premium were implemented
for Part A, spending in2012–36would decline by
2.4 percent, compared to the savings achieved
through theprovisionsof theAffordableCareAct
alone. Part A enrollment would also decline,
since some people would opt not to pay the pre-
mium and not to enroll in Part A.
Imposing steeper premiums, based on the cur-
rent schedule for Medicare Part B, would cause
cumulative spending in 2012–36 to decline by
17 percent. But such a step would also prompt
fewer potential Medicare beneficiaries to enroll
in Part A, leaving only 46.2 million seniors with
coverage in 2020. That amount would represent
a 20 percent reduction in enrollment relative to
the estimated number covered if the Affordable
Care Act provisions alone were implemented.
That large decline in coverage might make such
steep premiums untenable, especially because
most beneficiaries have paid taxes with the ex-
pectation of receiving coverage later in life.
We also estimated the effects of a flat
premium—that is, not means tested (Exhibit 4).
Relative to the means-tested scenarios, this ap-
proach would be simpler and would not create
“cliffs,” in which a small increase in a person’s
income could lead to a large change in his or her
premium. This scenario produced an additional
$300 billion in cumulative savings relative to the
first means-tested scenario, but it left an addi-
tional 500,000 people without coverage because
of a doubling of premiums for single people with
incomes below $85,000 and for couples with
incomes below $170,000.
Relative to the original premium-support sce-
nario, in which the credits people received were
indexed togrowth in thegrossdomestic product,
indexingcredits togrowth in theConsumerPrice
Index saved considerably moremoney, since the
indexgrowsmore slowly than thegross domestic
product (Exhibit 4).
Compared to the Affordable Care Act baseline
scenario, consumer-price-indexed credits led to
Exhibit 2
Projected Medicare Part A Enrollment, 2012–36
SOURCE Authors’ estimates using the Future Elderly Model (see Note 8 in text). NOTES “ACA only” is
projected spending with the policy changes included in the Affordable Care Act. “Part A premiums” is
“ACA only” and imposing means-tested premiums for Medicare Part A. “Premium support” is “ACA
only” and converting the entire Medicare program to a premium support plan. “Eligibility 67” is
“ACA only” and raising eligibility for Medicare from age sixty-five to age sixty-seven.
Exhibit 3
Projected Medicare Part B Enrollment, 2012–36
SOURCE Authors’ estimates using the Future Elderly Model (see Note 8 in text). NOTES “ACA only” is
projected spending with the policy changes included in the Affordable Care Act (because imposing
means-tested premiums for Part A would make no difference in Part B enrollment, in this exhibit—
unlike in Exhibits 1 and 2—there is no separate line for “Part A premiums”). “Premium support” is
“ACA only” and converting the entire Medicare program to a premium support plan. “Eligibility 67” is
“ACA only” and raising eligibility for Medicare from age sixty-five to age sixty-seven.
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a 24 percent decline in spending—the largest
reduction of any policy considered. But again,
the additional savings were accompanied
by a reduction in the number of people with
coverage—in this case, because the value of the
credit relative to the expected cost of health ser-
vices was reduced.
Finally, increasing the Medicare eligibility
age to seventy reduced cumulative spending
in 2012–36 by approximately 20 percent
(Exhibit 4). However, this option led to a larger
decline in enrollment than any of the other sce-
narios, reducing enrollment in both Parts A and
B by approximately 30 percent, compared to the
estimated number covered if the Affordable Care
Act provisions alone were implemented. The
reduction in spending was smaller than the re-
duction in enrollment because younger Medi-
care enrollees (those ages 65–70) tend to have
lower average spending than older enrollees.
Discussion
Despite their likely effectiveness at reducing
costs, all of the policy changes considered have
both advantages and disadvantages. Impor-
tantly, the policies would impose a burden on
enrollees by increasing the out-of-pocket spend-
ing amounts required to obtain health insur-
ance. Increasing the eligibility age would lead
to a loss of coverage among people just over
sixty-five, but it would preserve the current
generosity of the Medicare benefit for the oldest
Americans.
Because of provisions in the Affordable Care
Act, people losingMedicare coverage in this sce-
nario might have access to affordable insurance
through either a health insurance exchange or
the Medicaid program. However, particularly in
states that do not expand their Medicaid pro-
grams, some low-income seniors might fall
through the cracks.
There would also be secondary effects on
federal spending (not included in this analysis)
if seniors shifted from Medicare to the ex-
changes or Medicaid. For example, the Kaiser
Family Foundation estimates that exchange
premiums would increase by approximately
3 percent if people ages sixty-five and sixty-six
became ineligible for Medicare and if many
opted instead to enroll in private coverage of-
fered through exchanges.19
Instituting Part A premiums or a premium-
support plan would preserve at least the offer
of Medicare coverage to everyone who is eligible
today. However, because of the new cost-sharing
requirements that would be associated with
these options, some people would not enroll.
When we assumed a premium contribution
generally smaller than what would be required
for employer-sponsored coverage—our main
means-tested premium—spending decreased
by about 2.4 percent between 2012 and 2036,
and Part A enrollment declined by about the
same amount. A “back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tion” suggests that to achieve the same saving
with a payroll tax increase, taxes would need to
be increased by approximately $60 per worker
per year on a net present value basis.
Instituting a Part A premium based on the
current Part B premium would lead to larger
savings. However, Part B premiums are 25–
80 percent of expected health spending for
Part B services ($1,259–$4,028 annually in
2013). We estimate that requiring enrollees to
pay a comparable share of Part A expenditures
would cause Part A enrollment to decline by
20 percent, leaving 11.5 million seniors without
hospital insurance, compared to the baseline
Affordable Care Act scenario (Exhibit 4). Such
a massive reduction in enrollment could lead to
considerable problems, such as a large number
of seniors’ forgoing necessary treatment or
receiving uncompensated care. Imposing a flat
Exhibit 4
Results Of Sensitivity Analyses, Medicare Spending (2012–36) And Enrollment (2020)
Cumulative Medicare
spending ($ trillions)
Medicare enrollment
(millions), 2020
Scenario 2012–21 2012–36 Part A Part B
ACA only 5.8 16.7 57.7 52.4
No ACA 6.4 19.0 50.0 51.4
Part A premiums
Means-tested, main 5.7 16.3 56.6 52.4
Means-tested, Part B 5.1 13.8 46.2 52.4
10% premium 5.6 16.0 56.1 52.4
Premium support
GDP indexed 5.7 15.8 55.4 52.4
CPI indexed 5.0 12.7 50.4 49.0
Eligibility
Age 67 5.4 15.5 50.1 45.3
Age 70 4.7 13.4 40.2 35.8
SOURCE Authors’ estimates using the Future Elderly Model (see Note 8 in text). NOTES Spending is in
trillions of US dollars, net present value. Enrollment is in millions of people. “ACA only” is projected
spending with the policy changes included in the Affordable Care Act. “No ACA” is spending if the
Independent Payment Advisory Board created by the act fails to constrain spending and if other
Medicare savings policies in the act do not take effect. “Part A premiums” is “ACA only” and
imposing premiums for Medicare Part A. The “means-tested, main” scenario assumes that people
not eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid pay premiums of 5–25 percent of expected costs
depending on income. The “means-tested, Part B” scenario assumes that Part A premiums mirror
those of Part B: Most people pay premiums of 25 percent of expected costs, but those with
high incomes (see the text) pay up to 80 percent. The “10% premium” scenario assumes that
everyone, regardless of income, pays a premium equal to 10 percent of expected costs.
“Premium support” is “ACA only” and converting the entire Medicare program to a premium
support plan. The “GDP indexed” scenario assumes that credits are indexed to the projected rate
of gross domestic product (GDP) growth. The “CPI indexed” scenario assumes credits are indexed
to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). “Eligibility” refers to the age at which people become eligible
for Medicare, now sixty-five; the scenarios assume the age is increased to either sixty-seven or
seventy.
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10 percent premium on all Medicare Part A
enrollees would lead to spending declines of
4 percent in 2012–36, while Part A enrollment
would fall by just under 3 percent.
A premium-support program indexed to
growth in the gross domestic product reduced
estimated spending by approximately 5.4 per-
cent in 2012–36. However, this effect varied over
time,withmost of the savings coming after 2019.
A program indexed to growth in the Consumer
Price Index would lead to greater savings but
would also increase the share of the population
without coverage. Both of these policies would
have greater effects if Medicare expenditures
grew more rapidly than expected—as would be
the case, for example, if the Independent
Payment Advisory Board did not achieve
its goals.
Conclusion
The anticipated growth in Medicare spending is
amajor burden on the federal budget.We project
that cumulative Medicare spending between
2012 and 2036 will amount to $16.7 trillion on
a net present value basis.Without the cost-saving
provisions included in the Affordable Care Act,
which require reductions in Medicare payment
levels and assume that the Independent Payment
Advisory Board can contain health care cost
growth, cumulative Medicare spending between
2012 and 2036 could be as high as $19 trillion.
The policies considered in this analysis would
lead to substantial savings, with a reduction in
cumulative spending between 2012 and 2036 of
2.4–24.0 percent. Yet each policy would require
sacrifices in terms of eligibility and the burden
imposed on enrollees, and policy makers must
weigh the costs and benefits of the alternatives.
The most effective policies in terms of reduc-
ing spending—imposing a premium support
program indexed to growth in the Consumer
Price Index or raising the Medicare eligibility
age to seventy—would lead to enrollment reduc-
tions of 13 percent and 30 percent, respectively.
If such a decline in enrollment were to occur,
there could be serious consequences for popu-
lation health.
Many of those who would opt to disenroll
would be people with low incomes and without
good alternative health care or coverage options.
These uninsured elderly Americans would put a
strain on hospital emergency departments, and
some people would go without needed care. The
Affordable Care Act’s required reductions in
disproportionate-share hospital payments,
which compensate hospitals for serving low-
income patients, would add to the problem by
making it even more difficult for hospitals to
shoulder this unfunded burden.
The consequences for Medicare enrollment
are less extreme in scenarios with premium-
support credits indexed to growth in the gross
domestic product or with more modest Part A
premiums. However, because these policies are
also less effective at constraining costs, they re-
present at best a partial solution to the challenge
of rising Medicare costs. Thus, they would
need to be imposed together with other cost con-
tainment approaches if they were to substan-
tially change the Medicare cost trajectory. For
example, the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission has suggested,20 and the Obama
administration is reportedly considering,21 com-
bining Parts A and B into a single policy with a
uniform deductible. The proposed alignment
would probably raise out-of-pocket costs for
the physician services covered under Part B,
while simultaneously lowering out-of-pocket
costs for Part A (hospital) services.
Thepotential reduction in the effective deduct-
ible for Part A, along with theMedicare Payment
AdvisoryCommission’s related suggestion to cap
enrollees’maximum out-of-pocket expenditure,
could make premium increases more palatable.
Moreover, because Part B now requires ameans-
tested premium, combining Parts A and Bwould
provide anopportunity to adjust this premium to
reflect the combined costs of Parts A and B.
Optimal policy decisions in the face of limited
resources depend on broad societal goals—such
as whether it is preferable to provide a generous
benefit to a few or a small benefit to many.
Although no analysis can make these difficult
choices for us, projections like the ones we have
presented here are essential tomaking informed
policy decisions. ▪
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